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When Legal Cultures Collide 1 
RICHARD F. DEVLIN 
Every society has the tendency to reduce its opponents to caricatures - at least in 
imagination - and as it were to starve them. Such a caricature is ... our 'criminal.'2 
Friedrich Nietzsche 
The one duty we owe history is to rewrite it.' 
Oscar Wilde 
Introduction 
In this essay, I attempt to consider the juridical significance of the Irish 
hunger strike of 1981. I focus on this almost unreal, but tragically too 
real, 'event' for two reasons. First, on the basis of the rereading or rep­
resentation that I offer in this essay, the hunger strike provides an 
opportunity to reflect upon what ,is perhaps the most enduring and 
intractable question of social theory: the relationship between structure 
and agency. Specifically, it enables us to critically interrogate the aspira­
tions and assumptions of a colonial legal structure and the agentic resis­
tance of the juridically colonized. The second reason for my interest is 
more personal. As I was a law student in Belfast at the time, the strike 
has been a key aspect of my formative context and thus a constitutive 
part of my identity. In particular, by bringing into sharp relief the rela­
tionship between law, domination, violence, and death, the hunger 
strike has turned out to be a (not always conscious but pervasive) back-
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drop against which I have constructed both my political philosophy and 
my jurisprudence.4 
But I want to tell this story with a different voice from that which usually 
predominates in the dominant discourses of the North Atlantic societies. 
More precisely, I will filter my interpretation through the insights of both 
postmodernism and deconstruction. My purpose will be to consider the 
intersections between postmodernism/ deconstruction and nationalism 
in order to inquire into the utility of such perspectives in helping to de­
centre the hegemony of a dominant - read British - legal discourse and 
thereby to create space for the valorization of a marginalized and subordi­
nated legal discourse. My claim is that legal knowledge is itself a terrain of 
political struggle, and that dominant legal interpretations are only so 
because of their superior force, not because of their superior truth. 
However, although I will argue that postmodemism and deconstruc­
tion enable us to think critically about power, knowledge, truth, history, 
self, and language, at the same time, this case study will highlight what 
might be some of the weaknesses of postmodernism and deconstruction 
in their ability to 'put the dissidents back into history.'5 In particular, I will 
argue that the postmodern focus on texts and epistemology, while abso­
lutely necessary, is insufficient, and therefore that it needs to be supple­
mented by an emphasis on politics and ethics. My suggestion will be that 
those groups - and, in particular, those theorists - in North American 
society who espouse the embracement of postmodernism as providing a 
means for the achievement of difference and inclusion are excessively dis­
cursive in their conception of power, and therefore incapable of ade­
quately supporting a sufficiently destabilizing practice. My aim will be to 
walk the tightrope between those who posit that postmodernism and 
deconstruction are profoundly liberationist6 and those who argue that 
they are dangerously conservative. 7 
My analysis in this essay draws on some key motifs of both postmodern­
ism and deconstruction: alterity, otherness, pluralism, simulation, differ­
ence, and incommensurability. The essay is divided into three further 
sections. In part 2, I apply some of these insights to the events around the 
1981 hunger strike by Irish prisoners in British jails in the British-occu­
pied north of Ireland to advance the juridically impertinent proposition 
that what was at stake was not merely a politically strategic, last ditch act of 
desperation, but' (an)other' indigenously Irish legal claim based upon a 
subordinated legal culture, the Brehon Laws. Restated jurisprudentially, I 
will argue that the hunger strike can be conceived of as a 'jurisgenerative 
act. '8 In part 3, on the basis of this story, I develop some reflections as to 
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the utility of postmodernism and deconstruction for others who aspire to 
the legal recognition of difference. My aim here is to resist the tendency 
·towards disengagement and politic.ii quietism which may be engendered 
by some aspects of postmodernism and deconstruction. Finally, part 4 
provides some (in)conclusive thoughts. 
The Hunger Strike 
A History 
In this section, I develop a historical reconstruction and juridical revision 
of events leading up to and during the hunger strike of 1g81. History, as 
every good postmodernist knows, is contingent upon a choice of starting 
points and perspectives: it is partial (in both senses of the word) rather 
than total. Therefore, it seems to me that we can only fully appreciate the 
interpretation offered in this essay if we begin with the early years of what, 
colloquially, is called 'this round of the troubles' in Northern Ireland. 
In the late 1g6os, inspired by the protest movements in both the United 
States and Europe, a coalition of relatively progressive groups came 
together in the form of the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association 
(NICRA) to protest the discrimination against Catholics in Northern Ire­
land. Although a few members of. NICRA were republicans, the vast 
majority of those involved were socialists and liberal democrats .. 9 In spite 
of the fact that the demands of NICRA were essentially reformist, the 
local state response was one of unmediated p(?lice repression. 10 Worse 
still was the collusion between the repressive_state apparatuses and seg­
ments of the loyalist community whereby the former enabled the latter to 
embark upon vigilantism and pogroms, which were so widespread that 
(prior to the current civil war in 'Yugoslavia') they caused the greatest 
relocation of the civilian population anywhere in Europe since the Sec­
ond World War. 11 
Thus, I would argue it was the atavistic and repressive activities of the 
state - both active and passive - which generated the resurgence of the 
legitimacy of the IRA, because when the pogroms began the only people 
even partially able to defend the Catholic communities were very small 
numbers of IRA volunteers who had a few old rifles.12 With no sign of the 
pogroms abating, with the Catholics very much under siege, the British 
government acknowledged that the local security forces were so partisan 
that they were causing a legitimation crisis for the British state. As a result, 
the British government decided to dispatch soldiers to carry out what was, 
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in essence, a policing function. For a couple of months, there was a hon­
eymoon period between the British troops and the nationalist community 
- perhaps bred of dependency - but this began to deteriorate because of 
the partisan activities of some soldiers in favour of the loyalist communi­
ties, a very tentative emergence of military hostility by the IRA against a 
reintensified British presence on Irish soil, and, eventually, the imposi­
tion of a curfew and house-to-house searches in the (predominantly Cath­
olic) Lower Falls area of Belfast in July 1970. 
As to the legal system in this period, if people were arrested they were 
processed under the extremely Draconian Civil Authorities (Special Powers) 
Act. Yet, in spite of this, those processed and incarcerated under the act 
were treated as 'ordinary decent criminals' or 'ode's:' 
Though tension began to rise in 1970 between the IRA and the British 
Army, mostly in the form of rioting, it was not until February 1971 that the 
first British soldier was killed in Northern Ireland since the 192os, and 
from April forth the IRA began to develop a campaign of bombing. 
The response of the British state, at the bidding of unionist politi­
cians, 13 was to introduce internment without trial. Three hundred and 
forty-two people, all Catholics, many of them without any connection to 
the IRA, were arrested in the first raid on 9 August 1971. Within six 
months, a total of 2,357 people had been interned, again the vast majority 
of them being Catholics. 14 However, rather than being treated as 'ode's,' 
the majority were sent to a deserted Second World War air base - Long 
Kesh - placed in Nissen huts, and were able to operate as if they were in a 
prisoner-of-war camp. In effect, they had 'political status.' 
A much smaller number of 'suspects,' who were arrested and actually 
processed through the courts, were not placed in these hastily established 
prisoner-of-war camps. Rather, they were sent to the 9rdinary prisons and 
located in cells with no recognition of the political motivations for their 
'crimes' - nor of the fact that they were arrested and processed under the 
Special Powers Act. As a result, in mid:June 1972, about thirty republican 
prisoners who had been tried and convicted went on a hunger strike and, 
by the fourth week, had gained recognition of their 'special category 
status.' 15 
Internment and political/ special category status created a fundamen­
tal contradiction for the British state. On the one hand, Britain prided 
itself on being the great fountainhead of habeas corpus. And yet, the 
existence of several thousand untried prisoners was an acute embarrass­
ment. Thus in 1972, Lord Diplock issued his Reporl of the Commission to 
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which was an attempt to depoliticize the republican prisoners by encod­
ing them as 'criminals.' A key aspect of this report were proposals to elim­
inate the system of internment without trial by creating special juryless, 
single:judge courts that would, with the benefit of a 'modified' common 
law of confessions coupled with a shift in the burden of proof, be able to 
process 'suspected terrorists.' The agenda was to reassert the supremacy 
of the rule of law over the politicization of law. Diplock's recommenda­
tions were put into effect in the N'()7'them Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act, 
1973, in effect creating a conveyor-belt criminal process. 17 
But it was soon realized that the Diplock process of criminalization did 
not go far enough in delegitimizing the political integrity of the republi­
can prisoners because once convicted they were entitled to 'special cate­
gory status,' which had been gained by the hunger strike of 1972. As a 
result, Lord Gardiner (a former lord-chanceHor) was called upon by the 
British government to prepare a report that would further 'rationalize' 
the program of criminalization. He duly obliged and, in a report pub­
lished in January 1975, proposed that 'special category status' would not 
be available to those who were convicted of crimes committed after I 
March 1976. 18 
Central to the project of the removal of 'special category status' and its 
replacement with a program of 'criminalization' and 'normalization' 
were the elements of cellular rather than group confinement, and the 
wearing of prison uniforms. When the first post-March 1st prisoner was 
given his uniform in September 1976, he refused it and therefore, being 
without clothes, took refuge in his prison blankets. So began the 'blanket 
protest.' The response of the British state was to treat this as a breach of 
prison rules, and, therefore, the prison governor imposed harsh penal­
ties: 'a complete removal of remission; twenty-f�ur-hour lock-up; depriva­
tion of mental stimulation of any sort - reading material, newspapers, 
books, television, radio, games, hobbies or writing material. This was com­
bined with very intimate body searches' 19 and the reduction of visits to 
one half hour per month. By September 1977 there were about 16o 
republican prisoners 'on the blanket.' 
This situation continued with a hardening of positions through to April 
1978. At this point, in response to further 'disciplining' in relation to 
washing, as well as 'internal searches of the body, deprivation of letters, 
removal to punishment cells and beatings of young prisoners,'20 the pris­
oners refused to wash or cooperate in any way with the prison staff. But 
the spiral did not stop with this 'no wash protest.' As part of their policy of 
non-participation, the prisoners refused to slop out their chamber pots. 
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These pots, in tum, became part of the contested process in that they 
were frequently kicked over by prison guards in the course of the ongoing 
searches. To prevent this from happening, and specifically to avoid the 
soaking and soiling of their floor-based mattresses, the prisoners threw 
the contents ·of the pots out the windows and under the doors of their 
cells, but these were slopped back in by the prison guards. In turn, by the 
end of 1978, this led to the 'dirty protest,' in which the prisoners spread 
their own maggot-infested excrement on the walls of their cells. By 1979 
there were approximately 370 prisoners on the 'dirty protest.' 
As all the accounts of the hunger strike and the events prior to it indi­
cate, it was clear that it was the prisoners themselves_ who were setting the 
agenda.21 And while there was a significant mobilization on the outside to 
publicize the conditions, this was not generating sufficient pressure to 
force the British government to change its agenda of total criminaliza­
tion. In the face of such ox-like indifference of the British government, as 
1980 wore on, the prisoners decided that in pursuit of political status they 
would resort to a hunger strike to force the government to recognize 
their claims. However, the Army Council of the IRA objected to this inten­
sification of the protest, and Gerry Adams, as vice-president of Sinn 
Fein,22 communicated that the leadership of that organization was 'tacti­
cally, strategically, physically and morally opposed to a hunger strike.'23 
But in spite of these objections, on 10 October 1g80, the protesters 
announced a strike demanding 'as of right, political recognition and that 
we be accorded the status of political prisoners.'24 On 27 October, seven 
prisoners went on hunger strike. Bobby Sands was not one of them as he 
was given the position of OC in the camp. As the weeks progressed, 
despite the facade of intransigence on both sides, a series of secret negoti­
ations proceeded through intermediaries.25 The result was that, as one of 
the strikers seemed about to die prematurely on the fifty-third day, the 
British government appeared to acquiesce to the prisoners' demands by 
issuing a thirty-four-page document which seemed to suggest a step-by­
step de-escalation process that would in effect reinstate 'special category 
status.' The strike was called off. However, as became apparent over the 
next month, the demands were not met and the prisoners felt outma-
noeuvred and totally betrayed. 
Thus, in January of 1981, Sands took the initiative arid announced that 
a new strike would commence. But on this occasion there was a shift away 
from the focus on 'political status' to what became known as 'The Five 
Demands': the right to wear their own clothing at all times; exemption 
from all forms of penal labour; free association with each other at all 
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hours; the right to organize their own recreational and educational pro­
grams; and full restoration of remission. It was thought that this change in 
the rhetoric would provide the British government with greater space to 
compromise.26 The second hunger strike began on 1 March 1981, and the 
rest is history. Ten prisoners died before a solution was reached. But in 
the course of the fast, Sands - 'the criminal' - was elected to the British 
Parliament; Sinn Fein garnered remarkable local political support; and 
world attention was focused, not just on the strike, but on the intransi­
gence of the British attitude generally to Ireland. 
An Interpretation: Fasting as (An)other jural C/,aim 
The last several pages have attempted to provide a historical narrative of 
events leading up to, during, and after the hunger strike. This section 
provides an interpretation of these events, drawing on some of the 
insights of postmodernism and deconstruction. 
Deconstruction argues that the hierarchical construction of relation­
ships is central to logocentric thought. Derrida p9sits that all oppositions 
invoke 'a violent hierarchy. One of the two terms controls the other (axio­
logically, logically, etc.), or has the upper hand.'27 This is particularly per­
tinent for an understanding of the politics (and pretensions) of law. The 
point of logocentrism is to attempt to render that which is contingent, 
incontrovertible. Thus, within the dominant jurisprudential conception, 
law is conceptualized as both different from and hierarchically superior 
to politics in that the latter is acknowledged to be contaminated by vulgar 
interests, but law is said to be beyond the contingencies of politics. 
Thus, in relation to the hunger strike, one reas ·on why the British gov­
ernment was so keen on the program of 'criminalization' of the prisoners 
was to draw on the logocentric legitimacy of law� so as to put the issue of 
nationalist claims for self-determination beyond debate, to enforce clo­
sure by juridical fiat. Thatcher made much of this on a visit to Belfast after 
the deaths of several of the prisoners: 'Now what I am saying is we will 
uphold the law ... I cannot pull solutions out of a hat. I will not depart 
from upholding the law .. .'28 
As Michael Ryan reminds us, 'the authority of the sovereign's law 
depends upon the establishing of unambiguous proper meaning for 
words.'29 In Northern Ireland during the hunger strike era, the contested 
terms were 'law' and 'criminal.' The republican prisoners, however, 
refused to acquiesce in this totalizing trope of criminalization and 
attempted to destabilize and invert this hierarchical move by demonstrat-
i ' 
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ing the inherently political and partisan nature of the legal machinery. 
They called into question the rationalistic and progressive self-image of 
law, to tell a different story. 
One example illustrates these strategies of resistance that sought to 
undermine the British state's logocentric ambitions, and law's 'elective 
self-image. ' 30 It was the prisoners themselves (and contrary to the IR
A 
leadership's traditional policy of political abstentionism) who came up 
with the idea of proposing Sands as a candidate for the British Parlia­
ment.31 His election by over thrity thousand voters not only legitimized 
the demands for political status but also gave notice to the Thatcher 
regime that a political consciousness cannot simply be re-encoded by 
politico-:juridical relabelling. Moreover, and seemingly learning nothing, 
when Sands died, the government hurriedly passed the mendaciously 
entitled Representation of the Peop!,e Act, so as to prohibit any further prison­
ers from fulfilling their democratic mandat<:; in 'the mother of all_ parlia­
ments.' But this also failed because in Sands place his election agent 
increased the margin of victory by 786 votes. In sum, the British govern­
ment attempted to use the law to privilege one ideological perspective; 
the prisoners resisted such a move by asserting a_ contradictory claim, 
thereby shearing law of its metaphysical privileges. A$ Derrida posits, 'to 
deconstruct the opposition ... is first to overthrow the hierarchy.'32 
Viewed in this light, deconstruction helps us to destabilize hierarchical 
conceptions of the relationship between law and politics, confirming that 
law is always and already constituted by politics. 
This is not to say, however, that law is just politics. Rather, law is a par­
ticular kind of politics, one that commingles express exercises of power 
with implied normative visions. To elaborate. Most of the conventional 
reviews of hunger striking in Ireland trace back only as far as the practice 
had been adopted by the republican movement.33 Such a historical 
account identifies the hunger strike with the political ideology of republi­
canism. However, this is only a partial account. Hunger striking is not a 
recent phenomenon in Ireland. It is not reducible to republicanism. On 
the contrary, its roots can be traced back to an ancient, pre-Christian, 
Celtic legal code, the Brehon Laws,34 and the practice of cealachan or 
troscead, that is, fasting. Cealachan/troscead is a component of the ancient 
Irish Law of Athgabhail/Athgaba� which, in common law terms, one could 
consider to be analogous to distraint.35 Athgabhail 'is a general name for 
every coercion (lit. binding) through which each person enforces his 
[legal] interest'36 invoked, as Ginnell points out, so that 'advantage is 
obtained after disadvantage ... truth after untruth, legality after illegal-
I 
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ity, justice after ·injustice ... right after wrong.'37 Troscead (fasting) is the 
performative act that triggers the action in distraint. Stated simply, if . 
a person had been wronged by another who was more powerful - for 
example, a chieftain, brehon, bard, king, or bishop38 - having given 
appropriate notice, the wronged party was entitled to claim distress by 
fasting at the door of the wrongdoer. Responsibility for ending the fast 
vested in the perceived wrongdoer. If the latter allowed the plaintiff to 
starve to death, then the wrongdoer was held responsible for the death 
and had to compensate the victim's family. 
A central proposition advanced by this essay is that, building upon not 
only the political tradition of previous republican hunger strikes, but also 
upon the legal tradition of the Brehon Laws, at the margin of the British 
state in the H-Blocks, the prisoners rediscovered and reconstituted an 
almost silenced countervailing legal regime: The hunger strike, then, was 
not simply a last ditch desperate propaganda stunt, which has been the 
dominant interpretation. Rather, it was an irruption of an alterior juridi­
cal regime, the espousal of a cultural difference, the exposition of a jural 
other, the assertion of a legal right. 
It is imponant to note how this came about. The agenda of the British 
state was to eliminate the foundations of Irish identity, to totally erase 
locations of resistance. It realized that internment and the Diplock courts 
served to strengthen the integrity and legitimacy of the republican cause. 
It recognized that by taking activists from their communities, by impri­
soning them through the ideological trope of criminalization, they could 
perhaps silence the nationalist 'other.' But, at /the same time, it was 
understood by the government that by continuing with 'special category 
status,' they were allowing the persistence of_ two contradictions within 
their policies. First, 'special category status' was simply a euphemism for 
'political status' and therefore a discordant acknowledgment that there 
may be a certain legitimacy to the republican liberation struggle. Second, 
and just as important, 'special category status' acknowledged the military 
structure of the IRA and allowed free association and control over the rec­
reational and educational processes within Long Kesh to accrue to the 
military command of the IRA. In other words, the British government 
realized that internment and 'special category status,' though they tempo­
rarily divorced the IRA from the nationalist community, would have the 
effect of facilitating the emergence of what Sands would later describe as 
the 'politically educated armed guerilla fighter who will not only use his 
[sic] political mind to guide his weapon, but to guide and teach his politi­
cally undernourished countrymen to steer their own destiny .. .'39 
178 Richard F. Devlin 
Consequently, it was determined by the British that the repression 
would have to be intensified. First, in order to undermine the process of 
political radicalization fostered in Long Kesh, the 'Republican Univer­
sity,' it was necessary to rethink the architecture of coercion so as to 
undercut the groupist solidarity that the traditional military-type cage 
structure engendered. As a result, there emerged the idea of H-Block 
compounds. These were blocks of prison cells constructed in the shape of 
an H, with the four wings connected by an administrational cross-bar. 
Each block was capable of containing approximately eighty prisoners, 
each prisoner to be held in an eight-foot by ten-foot cell. Second, de­
radicalization required that both the nationalist community and the 
prisoners themselves cease accepting the code/ signifier of 'prisoners of 
war' and instead adopt the penal bureaucratic argot of 'ode' (ordinary 
decent criminal) o·r 'hac' (honest average criminal).40 It was this quest for 
the penal construction of 'the criminal' that generated the Gardiner 
Report' s  emphasis on uniforms, prison work, discipline, and the· curtail­
ment of opportunities for association and education. 
But at the margins of the British state, almost absented from the domi­
nant discourse, almost delegitimized within the nationalist communities, 
the prisoners continued their resistance. First, drawing on the significant 
increase in the educational aspects of republican tradition in the last 
years of 'special category status,' the H-Blocks became both a conduit for 
the dissemination of Irish history and a school for reflection on leftist­
inspired revolutionary strategies.41 Second, and of crucial importa�ce to 
this process of consciousness raising, was the switch to the use of Irish lan­
guage. This was required because the new cellular structure required that 
if the prisoners sought to communicate with each other, they would have 
to shout. But shouting in English would, obviously, render their commu­
nications accessible to the prison guards. The solution was to encode the 
conversations in a modified version of the Irish language that the prison­
ers with an earnest humour called 'jailic.'42 Third, this translation, in 
turn, engendered a greater consciousness of Irish history. Of particular 
significance was the interrogation of the legal basis of British colonialism 
and the rediscovery of the ancient Irish Brehon Laws and, most notably 
for the purposes of this essay, the practice of troscead. Thus, having disin­
terred what might be called 'a juridical unconscious,'43 the prisoners 
could identify Brehon law as a different legal culture. 
Consequently, when the announcement of 10 October 198o claimed 
that the hunger strike was based on 'a right,' · it was not simply rhetoric. 
Not only did the prisoners base their claim on the terrain of political 
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struggle, or the republican tradition of self-immolative martyrdom,44 
which are the two conventional interpretations. It was also a profound 
juridical claim premised upon a subordinated, and therefore ex-centric 
but not eliminated, legal culture. Indeed, a recently published interview 
with a former prisoner of the hunger strike period indicates this: 
With the Gaelic you begin to get back in touch with political and ideological con­
cepts. For instance ceolathan, where in the Brehon laws to express a grievance 
against an injustice a guy sat outside the wrongdoer's house and starved himself to 
death. Now cealachon [sic] had a whole moral import to it that it wasn't a hunger 
strike as a protest weapon; it was the legal assertion of your rights. The hunger 
strike was a legitimate and moral means for asserting those rights, and it had legal 
precedents dating back to antiquity. You found that there was a literature that 
was untranslatable from the Gaelic that could never be expressed in the cold 
English.45 
The peculiarity is that rather than formulating their claim in some 
fomialistic and bureaucratic cause of action - a form of encoding or 
translation that severs the plaintiffs from their claim - the fasting prison­
ers reconstituted their bodies as a jural template so that their claim was, 
literally, one of life or death. 
To recap. The essentially rehabilitative claim that I have advanced is 
that not only is law politically manipulatable, but also that law is, in a 
strong sense, culturally contingent; that it is 'local knowledge, not place­
less principle.'46 The hunger strike of 1981 represents and signifies a colli­
sion of incommensurable legal cultures in which one - the Brehon 
tradition of the disempowered fasting against the empowered - because 
of its marginalized status was not encoded or intelligible ('untranslat­
able') as such because of the hegemonic ascendency of the common law 
juridical psyche. Through the deconstructive supplementary logic of 
reversal and displacement, I wish to rehabilitate this almost erased ethico­
juridical other, to reconceptualize fasting as a practice of juridical decolo­
nization, and to posit that the response of the British state in refusing to 
recognize this other legal culture is but another form of violence. 
The Political Ambivalences of Postmodemism 
The purpose of this section is to further this interpretation of legal prac­
tices, legal institutions, and legal structures through the grid of post­
modernism and deconstruction, and to consider the adequacies of these 
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modes of analysis, not just as interpretive techniques, but as potential 
juridico-social theories.47 Moreover, I propose to consider Derrida's 
recent claim that deconstruction is 'revolutionary,' in the sense 'that it 
assumes the right to contest, and not only theoretically, constitutional 
protocols ... the right to contest established law in its strongest authority, 
the law of the State. '48 
Although postrnodernism as political philosophy and deconstruction as 
critical method49 do not share an identity, there are certain elements of 
homology, continuity, and overlap that are of interpretive value. Given its 
complex and portmanteau character, postrnodernism is notoriously diffi­
cult to get a handle on. This is because it spans a -variety of cultural and 
academic fields, has advocates who frequently adopt profoundly incom­
patible perspectives, revels in its ephemeral, splintered, and fractured 
dynamism, and - as a result of its predilection for being 'post' - is reluc­
tant to construct any determinative or homogeneous self-image. Never­
theless, in spite of its slipperiness, I do think that it is possible to provide 
an account (though not a definition) of postmodernism in which a few 
common motifs50 relate to my discussion. 
Of particular importance to this essay, especially in connection with its 
relation to deconstruction, are the politico-epistemological propositions 
associated with postmodernism. First, and perhaps most importantly, 
postmodernism ' s  embracement of alterity · and 'otherness'51 has meant 
that 'reality' is deprived of its objective foundations, and is re-understood 
as flimsy, fragmentary, unstable, heterogeneous, and plural.52 In this 
light, 'authenticity' and 'reality' are re-encoded as 'fabrication' and 
'simulation. '53 Second, and closely related, because our relationships 
with reality are socially mediated and constructed, knowledge too is said 
to lack any objective non-contingent foundation. Such an interpretive 
approach to knowledge is sometimes called 'perspectivism'54 or 'anti­
foundationalism '55 in that it posits that there can be a plurality of mutu­
ally incommensurable perspectives offering equally valid interpretations. 
Postmodernism dismantles 'Truth,' at least with a capital T.::fi Third, post­
modernism is so radical in its disassembly and decomposition of conven­
tional wisdom that it argues that the very idea of 'the individual' or 'the 
subject' is up for grabs. It posits that so pervasive are the social structures 
and narragves, that we can no longer be confident of the humanist faith 
in an essentialist, pre-social, coherent, unified, and autonomous self. 
Rather, even the self is constructed to the core. Derrida, for example, 
talks about the 'death' of the subject,57 and Baudrillard calls for a 'renun­
ciation of the position of the subject. '58 If postmodernists are accurate in 
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this claim, then they obviously problematize our traditionally received 
ideas about autonomy, freedom, choice, and agency.59 Finally, according 
to Baudrillar4, several political consequences emerge from these socio­
logical and epistemological propositions. Most importantly, he argues 
that power needs to be reconceptualized. 'No more subject, focal point, 
centre or p�riphery: but pure flexion or circular inflection. No more vio­
lence or surveillance: only "information," secret with virulence, chain 
reaction, slow implosion and simulacra of spaces where the real effect 
comes into play.'60 Indeed, because 'power is no longer present except to 
conceal that there is none'61 then 'law and order themselves might be nothing 
more than a simulation. '62 All of which is to say that 'the political sphere 
(and power in general) becomes empty,'63 so that 'power pure and simple 
disappears. '64 As a consequence of this dispersed conception of power, 
the idea - indeed the very possibility - of. political praxis needs to be 
reconsidered. 
Postmodernism and deconstruction share some political motifs. By 
highlighting the constructed and necessarily relational nature of that 
which would be incontrovertible, the deconstructive technique of dif­
ferana endangers and deflates logocentrism. Deconstruction uncovers the 
plurality of possibilities and demonstrates that what is centralized is 
dependent upon the repression of alternative contenders by relegating 
them to the margins. This process of foregrounding contradiction, anom­
aly, and irrationality is considered to be empowering in that deconstruc­
tion creates the . possibility for dismantling binary oppositions and 
revivifying that which has been submerged. Decon�truction creates condi­
tions hospitable to the 'return of the repressed.' 
Derrida's concepts of 'marginality, supplementarity, differance and 
deconstruction'65 have helped me to better reconsider and explain my 
own understanding of the hunger strike. In its disinterring and valoriza­
tion of 'alterity' - the existence and potential legitimacy of otherness -
postmodernism also allows space for at least a hearing of alternative and 
deviant perspectives. There is, then, an intersection between my analysis 
of the hunger strike, and postmodernism and deconstruction. 
However, it would be a mistake to confuse intersection with consensus. 
There is, of course, an obvious postmodern response to my analysis: that 
my argument may tend to privilege consciousness and therefore smack of 
a revivalist and revolutionary voluntarism that is dependent upon an ide­
alistic and nostalgic humanism. Nationalism, after all, is but a by-product 
of modernity and modernist thinking.66 More specifically, the postmod­
ernist counter-argument would probably be that the fasting prisoners 
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were but the 'effect,' determination,67 'site,'68 or symptom of the various 
discourses and structures of Irish republicanism. They were inscriptions 
of a deviationist subtext, not authors of their destiny. In this section, I 
want to cautiously and critically relate my analysis to those of deconstruc­
tion and postmodernism, especially as they are manifested in the work of 
Derrida and, more briefly, Baudrillard. 
Derrida argues that ' ... the task [ of deconstruction] is ... to dismantle 
the metaphysical and rhetorical structures which are at work [in the text] , 
not in order to reject or discard them, but to reinscribe them in another 
way.'69 A central step in this process is what he calls 'reversal' :  
I strongly and repeatedly insist on the necessity of the phase of reversal, which 
people have perhaps too swiftly attempted to discredit ... To neglect this phase o� 
reversal is to forget that the structure of the opposition is one of conflict and sub­
ordination and thus to pass too swiftly, without gaining any purchase against the 
former opposition, to a neutralization which in practice leaves things in their former 
state and deprives one of any way of intervening effectively. 70 
The reinscription that I have suggested is the reverse proposition that 
although the hunger strike demonstrated the politics of British law, it also 
was an indigenously Irish legal claim, the articulation of what Geertz has 
called an alterior 'legal sensibility,' another 'form of juristical life.'71 How­
ever, from a postmodernist perspective· such an argument may be exces­
sively voluntaristic in that it overinflates the 'creativity' of the prisoners. 
Derrida has been particularly explicit in his disparagement of 'the sub­
ject.' For example, at one point, he argues that 'the subject' is but 'the 
play of linguistic or semiological differance' 72 and, at another, posits that 
'the authority of representation constrains us, imposing itself on our 
thought through a whole dense, enigmatic and heavily stratified history. 
It programs us and precedes us.'73 More expansively: 
. . . the subject (in its identity with itself, or eventually in its consciousness of its 
identity with itself, its self consciousness) .is inscribed in language, is a 'function• of 
language, becomes a speaking subject only by making its speech conform - even in 
so-called 'creation,' or so-called 'transgression' - to the system of the rules of lan­
guage as a system of differances, by conforming to the general law of differana.14 
And, with admirable anti-logocentric consistency, Derrida confesses his 
own lack of agency by denying that he chooses interpretations; rather, 
'the interpretations select themselves.'75 
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In relation to something like the hunger strike, this espousal of textual 
determinism is an attractive thesis in that it seems to explain that which is 
apparently so eccentric as to be inexplicable: the self-sacrifice of the self 
in full knowledge of the likelihood of death. However, the problems with 
an adoption of this deconstructive/postmodernist approach to the ques­
tion of the subject are twofold. First, it is insufficiently oppositional in its 
politico-juridical orientation; and, second, it potentially reinforces contin­
ued oppression. 
The first argument against an excessively thin theory of the subject pos­
its that, in its best light, postmodernism provides little account of how the 
repressed actually determine their condition, make choices, and resist 
their oppression. The sort of propositions advanced by Derrida run the 
risk of oversimplifying the relationship between agency and structure, of 
merely inverting the humanist hierarchy of agency over structure and 
therefore simply mimicking it.76 But perhaps this goes too far and what is 
required is an intermediary mediation between structure and agency, so 
that liberal humanism's ontological fetishization of the sovereign, coher­
ent subject is not simply replaced by an excessive and reactive anti­
humanism,77 thereby slipping into an anti-theory of agency. There is a dif­
ference between: (a) a sovereign conception of the subject, in which the 
person is assumed to be unified, rational, and voluntaristic (the liberal 
humanist position); (b) a concatenated conception of the subject that, 
because of its deterministic arguments, denies the possibility of self-con­
stitution in any strong sense, and thereby the possibility of oppositional 
strategies (the postmodernist position); and (c) a' situated or embedded 
conception of the subject,78 which allows for the possibility of conscious­
ness and self-constitution in the context of the matrix of societal and cul­
tural influences (my position). In other words, what is required is a 
relational and historicized theory of the subject, a relational and histori­
cized conception of agency. Such an on to logy envisions the subject as nei­
ther the centre of the universe nor a mere concatenation of social forces, 
but a subject who is both constituted and constitutive. 
There is little doubt that republicanism as a discourse is an important 
factor in Irish life, but it is not so determinative or constraining as post­
modernists might have us believe. Republicanism in the late 1970s and 
early 1980s underwent a significant transition from its classical political 
abstentionist and exclusively militaristic form, to a politically participatory 
and more social movement. Postmodern methodology enables us to track 
this transition by encouraging us to look at the micro-details of this devel­
opment. In particular, we would have to analyse the changing subjectivi-
184 Richard F. Devlin 
ties and emerging ideologies of actors such as Gerry Adams79 and Bobby 
Sands80 - Irish, Belfast-reared, male, working-class, (a)religious - and the 
differences of opinion within the Army Council of the IRA. Most particu­
larly, we can learn from 'the comms' that were smuggled out of the H­
Blocks prior to, and during, the fast. These are perhaps the classic post­
modern deviationist micro-texts in that as much as four thousand words81 
could be written with a biro refill tube on one cigarette paper or 'stamped 
government property toilet roll.'82 They would then be smuggled to the 
outside command structures of the IRA through bodily orifices - them­
selves penetratingly surveilled83 - but by means of which the prisoners 
themselves determined the cha'nge of direction and future agenda of 
republicanism.&! By means of these 'comms,' the prisoners disseminated 
an alternative political vision for the IRA and even outlined the most 
appropriate strategies of mobilization, from massive postering campaigns 
to the standing of fasting prisoners as election candidates.85 
To elaborate. As the late 1970s wore on, it became increasingly appar­
ent to the prisoners that, despite some outside support, their various pro­
tests were not going to change the British state's determination to impose 
criminalization, nor generate further support for political status in the 
nationalist community. The terrain of struggle was significantly enlarged 
when the prisoners - against the wishes of the Army Council - decided 
that by means of a hunger strike there could be the galvanization of the 
nationalist community around republicanism. In other words, it was 
determined by the prisoners that the traditionally sanctified unidimen­
sional military campaign on its own would not succeed. But although the 
first couple of weeks of the fast expanded the support network, still the 
majority of the nationalist community remained leery. The key break­
through occurred when it  was decided - once again by the fasting 
prisoners86 - that the traditional republican position of abstentionism 
from political campaigns should be abandoned, and it was proposed to 
run Bobby Sands -as the candidate for the British Parliament. This strategy 
forced the issue w_ithin the nationalist community as to whether it  would 
split the vote between the republican Sands and the constitutionalist 
SDLP and thereby let the single unionist candidate win. The constitution­
alists backed down, · thereby giving the full political stage to Sands. The 
result was that on.g April 1981, a self-confessed IRA volunteer was elected 
to the British Parliament with 30,492 votes, in effect inverting the crimi­
nalization agenda of the British state. Boomerang. 
Furthermore, the election of two more fasting prisoners in a general, 
election in the Republic of Ireland was crucial to the defeat of the govern-
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ing party, Fianna Fail.87 Finally, the strike and the events around it con­
firmed that the traditional republican stance of political abstentionism in 
deference to militarism was misconceived and served as a catalyst for Sinn 
Fein to participate in subsequent local, general and European elections, 
obtaining between 10.2 per cent and 13.4 per cent of the overall vote, or 
between 25 per cent to 40 per cent of the nationalist vote in Northern Ire­
land.88 The prisoners negated the negation. Resistance though marginal, 
suitably engendered, can erupt in phenomenal ways. 
My apprehensions about the progressive political utility of deconstruc­
tion and postmodernism are intensified when I review some of the more 
explicitly 'political work' of Derrida, for he is equivocal as to the political 
ramifications of his own project. Because of his anti-theory of the subject, 
Derrida seems to be insufficiently attuned to what I would describe the 
noisy agency of the subjugated, but not totally erased, subject. 
At first blush, it would seem unfair to complain about Derrida's 
political progressivism, given that in 1983 he wrote a short essay which 
challenged not only apartheid but also the West's complicity in its perpet­
uation.89 Moreover, apparently in reply to those who have voiced con­
cerns about the political significance of deconstruction, he has argued 
(with uncharacteristic clarity) that 
what is somewhat hastily called deconstruction is not, if it is of any consequence, a 
specialized set of discursive procedures, even less the rules of a new hermeneutic 
method, working on texts or utterances in the shelter of a given and stable institu­
tion. It is also, at the very least, a way of taking a posi�on, in its work of analysis, 
concerning the political and institutional structures that make possible and gov­
ern our practice, our competencies, our performances. Precisely because it is 
never concerned only with signified content, deconstruction should not be sepa­
rable from this politico-institutional problematic and should seek a new investiga­
tion of responsibility, an investigation which questions the codes inherited from 
ethics and politics. This means that too political for some, it will seem paralyzing 
to those who only recognize politics by the most familiar road signs.90 
While this seems to be an unequivocal articulation of the political ramifi­
cations of deconstruction, it is, in my opinion, vitiated in two ways. First, 
the comment lacks any specificity as to what might qualify as a desirable 
'position' or constitute an appropriate act of 'responsibility.' The abstrac­
tion of the argument renders it indeterminate and therefore potentially 
as supportive of oppressive political practices as liberationist political 
practices. Second, on what basis are we to justify any 'position' that we 
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might 'choose' - or is it that such positions might 'choose' us? - if decon­
struction has as its primary purpose displacement and the proliferation of 
multiplicity? 
Indeed, despite these claims as to the political relevance of deconstruc­
tion, on other occasions Derrida has also expressed reservations: 'I must 
confess that I have never succeeded in directly relating deconstruction to 
existing political programmes.'91 But he then proceeds to argue that this 
does not require inaction or non-commitment: 
But the difficulty is to gesture in opposite directions at the same time: on the one 
hand to preserve a distance and suspicion with regard ·to the official political 
codes governing reality; on the other, to intervene here and now in a practical 
and engaged manner whenever the necessity arises. This position of dual alle­
giance, in which I personally find myself, is one of perpetual uneasiness. I try 
where I can to act politically while recognizing that such action remains incom­
mensurate with my intellectual project of deconstruction.92 
And to be fair fo Derrida, it must be acknowledged that Derrida the inter­
ventionist has taken some progressive political positions. So, for example, 
in 1981 he visited Prague to meet with some dissident intellectuals. For his 
troubles he was arrested and jailed for three days. But what did Derrida 
. the deconstructionist philosopher make of his experience? As one com­
mentator reports, Derrida 'insisted on the difficulty there is in making an 
ethico-political gesture (supporting the resistance of the Prague philoso­
phers, who demand respect for human rights ... and articulate that with a 
philosophy of the subject, the person, individual liberty etc) coincide with 
a philosophical labour governed by the necessity of deconstructing pre­
cisely such philosophemes. '93 Viewed in this light, political prisoners in 
British,.occupied Northern Ireland could expect little in the way of intel­
lectual support from deconstruction. 
Nor is Derrida alone in his quietism, in the retreat from the discussion 
of praxis. Baudrillard, too, has suggested that given the pervasiveness of 
hyper-reality and hyper-conformity,94 then 'withdrawing into the private 
could well be a direct defiance of the political, a form of actively resisting 
political manipulation.'95 For him ' indifference,' inertia, and non-partici­
pation are the only available 'counter-strategies' :96 'This revolution by 
involution ... proceeds by inertia and not from a new and joyous negativ­
ity. It is silent and involutive - exactly the reverse of all speechmaking and 
consciousness raising. It has no meaning, it has nothing to say to us.'97 
Yet again, events in the H-Blocks problematize the validity of such asser­
tions. It is not that the prisoners have 'nothing to say ' ;  rather, it is that 
,. 
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they have had 'no say.'98 As pointed out previously, one reason why the 
British government chose the cell system of incarceration was to under­
mine the collectivism and solidarity fostered in the dormitory-type cages 
of Long Kesh. The H-Blocks were originally designed to accommodate 
one prisoner per cell, and prisoners, on entering, for the first year or so, 
were subjected to a rigorous regime of silence: communication with their 
colleagues was prohibited.99 Such a strategy of isolation and individualiza­
tion was tailored to reinforce the project of criminalization. But the pris­
oners resisted, both instrumentally and structurally. Instrumentally, they 
began to communicate to each other by tapping on the heating pipes, 
exchanging 'comms' at the weekly mass (one of the few opportunities for 
interaction) ,  and by gradually reviving the Irish language. Structurally, 
because of the nature of the 'dirty protest,' it meant that in otder for the 
prison authorities to periodically clean the cells to prevent diseases, one 
of the arms of the H had to be kept vacant, so as to shift the prisoners to 
that section while the other was being cleaned.100 This, in conjunction 
with the very high imprisonment rates generated by the Diplock court sys­
tem, created an overpopulation problem for the prison administration, 
which was 'solved' by putting two prisoners in most cells and thereby 
undermining the original plan for a regime of silence. It was this recon­
solidation of collectivism that engendered the group solidarity necessary 
to sustain the 'blanket,' 'no wash,' and 'dirty' protests and, eventually, to 
plan and pursue the hunger strike. It was only during the fast itself that 
the silence re-emerged, for, as one ex-prisoner has put it: 
I 
The slagging and practical joking stopped during the hunger strike. I minded 
Bobby [Sands] saying the joking shouldn't decrease .. But it was dead artificial. 
There was no fucking singsongs. We tried but it wouldn't work. Bobby had asked 
us not to get into the silence. We were all in mourning for the duration. 101 
Thus to summarize my first criticism of postmodernism's thin theory of 
the subject, I would argue that at the level of theory its conception is so 
emaciated (and there is no pun intended) that it is incapable of bearing 
the explanatory weight that is imposed upon it. Therefore, it is proposed 
that we should see agency and discourse as mutually constitutive. How­
ever, we can only understand the degree and extent of that mutuality by 
actually studying specific situations in particular politico-historical con­
junctures. This is what I have attempted to do by focusing on the fast. 
The second problem with the postmodern process of the 'aestheticiza­
tion of politics' 102 - that it may be complicit in the continuation of oppres­
sion - relates to the potentially legitimizing function that the espousal of 
I 
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'hyper-reality' and 'simulation' may accrue to the benefit of those who 
wield the predominant political power. Two aspects of Baudrillard's anal­
ysis are worth noting in this respect. 
First, Baudrillard, in his celebration of the politics of silence, character­
izes the masses as 'dumb like beasts,' 103 but, as I have pointed out, the 
imposition of the regime of silence was a central component of the crimi­
nalization project of the British state. It was through the articulation of 
their humanity, identity, and integrity that the prisoners resisted such 
silencing. Second, by portraying the hunger strike as merely a particular 
manifestation of hyper-reality, by interpreting it as yet another manifesta­
tion of 'ubiquitous simulacra, pseudo-events, ' 104 Baudrillard may trivialize 
the commitment and political consciousness of the subject hunger strik­
ers. Death through starvation for over sixty days is more than simulation; 
it is more than game playing; it is more than a spectacle in the politics of 
illusion. Death, I would argue, is a powerful act of resistance in which 
agency draws on its final resource to transgress against a pseudo­
hegemonic politico-juridical regime. 105 In other words, postmodernism 
unmodified may suggest too much complicity and not enough critique, 
an inability to distinguish between domination and resistance. 1o6 It may 
be accurate to argue we cannot know what the fasting prisoners sought 
was true in•any transcendental sense, but that means neither that 'truth ... 
[has] ceased to exist,'107 nor that we should consider subjects as paralysed 
by 'the spell of indecision,' 1o8 nor that we have 'nowhere to go.' 109 
In order to escape the relativizing drift and political quandary that post­
modernism's embracement of a radical anti-humanism might impose, I 
would suggest that we can draw on, but adapt to the present context, the 
work of the sociologist Margrit Eichler. In relation to issues of gender, 
Eichler argues that in a world based upon (male) domination we cannot 
know what (gender) equality might look like, and consequently.we should 
refocus our sights on what we do know, inequality, and make our task one 
of modifying and minimizing these inequalities. 1 10 Similarly, it can be 
argued that although we cannot know what an authentic reality might look 
like, we can know those things that are manifestly untrue and so our task 
becomes one of minimizing the pervasiveness of these untruths. And, as I 
have argued, it is clearly untrue that the fasting prisoners were nothing but 
ordinary .criminals. The motivations for their alleged crimes were political; 
the modes of their arrests and interrogations were the product of excep­
tional powers; their alleged confessions were obtained under precisely 
tailored conditions; their trials were specially constructed through the 
Diplock process; and their treatment in prison was politically motivated, 
J 
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particularly the beatings. 1 11 How else is one to explain the fact that between 
196g and 198o the prison population increased by almost 500 per cent,1 12 
except by acknowledging - as both a former Northern Ireland premier 
(Major Chichester Clark) and British secretary of state (Reginald Mau­
dling) have done - that the Northern Irish and British states are at 'at war' 
with the IRA? 1 13 In short, there is a radical discordancy between the jurid­
ical construction of the prisoners as 'ode's' and the incontrovertible exist­
ence of a specifically tailored legal process that simply cannot fit within the 
frame of that legal construct. Thus, it seems to me that if we reorient our 
inquiry from the quest for truth to the minimization of untruths, then we 
can adopt the postmodern virtue of self-reflexivity and self-consciousness 
without necessarily being forced to embrace its vice of being self­
undermining. 114 As Bernstein, echoing Habermas, points out, 'violence 
and distortion may be uneliminable, but they can be diminished.' 1 15 
For some of those who subscribe to postmodernism and deconstruc­
tion, my foregoing reflections on law, agency, truth, and death will be 
understood as being premised upon a vision - the identity politics of lrish 
nationalism - that is subject to the withering gaze of deconstruction. 
To elaborate. It might well be argued that insofar as my conception of 
jurisprudence converts a 'conception of identity into a ground of poli­
tics' 1 16 it is necessarily subject to the deconstructive insight that such a 
strategy is dependent on a point of contradiction: in this case, the British 
law. Deconstruction, I am likely to be reminded, demands more than a 
mere reversal of hierarchy, for that merely reproduces binarism without 
subverting the very concept of hierarchy; displacement engenders a mul­
tiplicity that cannot be reduced to (nationalist) identity. Thus, the valori­
zation of identity - an Irish jural other - reinforces and perpetuates the 
very system of domination that it seeks to transgress - British juridical 
colonialism - achieving what Schlag suggests is only a 'suicidal reinscrip­
tion of precisely the sort of hierarchal dualities . . .  that deconstruction 
seeks to subvert and displace.' 1 17 Identities constrain, and therefore what 
is required is 'a liberation from identity.'118 Moreover, given postmodern­
ism's commitment to anti-essentialism and its embracement of the social 
constructionist thesis, the very idea of an Irish identity is but a delusive 
artifact, a quaint ethnocentric sentimentality, and therefore incapable of 
bearing the juridical weight that I would wish to impose upon it. 
In response to these charges, three points might be made. First, I would 
want to argue that although I recognize that identity politics are necessar- • 
ily incapable of having an essentialist base, that does not mean that they 
are unhelpful, and certainly not irretrievably reactionary. Rather, we can 
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recognize the inevitably artifactual nature of a perspective - and can even 
countenance the dynamic nature of such identities - but still operate in a 
self-reflexive way on the basis of such identities. Irish republicanism of the 
1970s and 198os illustrates this. As I have indicated previously, in the 1970s 
and particularly within the 'republican university,' Long Kesh, republi­
canism underwent a significant transition from being exclusively militaris­
tic and abstentionist in its orientation to being politically participatory 
and self-consciously socialist. This transformation of identity was con­
firmed at the Ard Fheis (Annual Conference) of Sinn Fein in 1g85, when 
the political and ideological leadership of the organization was trans­
ferred from the conservative purists of the south ()f Ireland to the leftist 
pragmatists of the north of Ireland. To argue that identity has no natural, 
essential , or absolute significance, to accept the impossibility of 'a rigor­
ously pure self-identity,' 1 19 does not necessarily commit one to the paralys­
ing and indifferent claim that identity politics is misconceived. It simply 
allows us to recognize that difference and identity are constitutively inter­
locking, to be conscious of the inevitability of political change, and to 
forewarn us not to expect or impose closure. 
Second, and more important, to accept the relentless postmodern posi­
tion that the subject is concocted to the core leads, potentially, to a radi­
cally individualized politico-ontology. If So, this might well have the effect 
of marginalizing the group aspects of our identity, thereby, though per­
haps inadvertently, fostering singularity rather than solidarity. As a conse­
quence, postmodernism may devalue that a_spect of ourselves that many 
value highly: our group membership.120 And for the subordinated, this 
experience of group identity may act as a form of empowerment and soli­
darity. Once again the H-Blocks provide an example of how solidarity is 
achieved through what one commentator has described as 'the solidarity 
of collective vocality,' 121 that is, Gaelic. 
Third, and this is a more negative and clearly strategic argument, it is 
not as if identity politics is the 'chosen' terrain of struggle by the disem­
powered. In common with many forms of oppression - for example, sex­
ism or racism - those who oppress on the basis of nationalism do so, in 
part, because of the 'identity' of the other. The 'criminalization' project 
of the British government was very much driven by the question of iden­
tity; its aim was to efface the nationalist liberation justifications for the 
prisoners' alleged acts in order to 'identify' them as 'criminals. '  The pro­
tests and the fasts were an attempt to reassert their identity and their legal 
rights as prisoners of war on the basis of that identity. In short, identity is 
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I find myself in a curious situation in this essay. On the one hand, I find 
that postmodemism and deconstruction through their critiques of hierar­
chy, subordination, and oppression open up the space for the emergence 
and even possible valorization of different voices. Yet, on the other hand, 
at the very same moment, they may undermine such perspectives by argu­
ing that they are but an interpretation with no necessary connection to 
reality, truth, or justice, or at least no connection that would make a dif­
ference. I only want to go halfway, to acknowledge that postmodernism 
can be a form of resistance 122 but without having to purchase its unre­
quited guardedness. I want to employ its strategies as a mode of politico­
juridical analysis in order to deconstruct Britain's juridical hegemony, in 
order to facilitate a reconfiguration of Anglo-Irish relations. As Linda 
Hutcheon says of feminist encounters with postmodernism, 'exposition 
may be the first step; but it cannot be the last.' 123 
To maintain this position, to avoid this sense of one step forward, one 
step back, it will be necessary to draw a distinction between postmodern­
ism as a political philosophy and deconstruction as a method of interpre­
tation, to argue an embracement of the latter as a mode of empowerment 
does not require a commitment to the former with its eschewal of politi­
cal practice and its predilection for relentless sceptical indifference. 124 
However, deconstruction, too, will have to be revised, dereified, and 
deflated. It must be shorn of its pretensions to be 'a general law,' 125 a gen­
eralization 'without present or perceptible limit,' 126 or a canonized cog­
nate of 'justice.' 1 27 Regardless of what Derrida -' the author - might say, 128 
deconstruction itself is probably best understood as a rigorous129 method­
ology that enables us to critically interrogate those propositions that 
aspire to be universal, authoritative, and logical; to demonstrate how they 
are, in fact, contingent, ambiguous, and arbitrary. Subject to this not 
insignificant revision, I therefore agree with Derrida when he quips, 'The 
fact that law is deconstructible is not bad news. We may even see in this a 
stroke of luck for politics, for all historical progress."3° 
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